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ARTICLES 
ROBERT JACKSON’S CRITIQUE 
OF TRUMP V. HAWAII 
WILLIAM R. CASTO† 
If the people ever let the command of the war power fall into 
irresponsible and unscrupulous hands . . . .1 
— Robert Jackson 
I. INTRODUCTION
Over seventy years ago, United States Supreme Court Justice 
Robert H. Jackson accurately predicted the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Trump v. Hawaii.2  As he foresaw, the Court rubber-
stamped a President’s purposeful discrimination against a minor-
ity religion.  This brief Essay explains Trump using Jackson’s 
critique of judicial review in national-security cases.3  The Essay 
also uses Trump to examine a flaw—probably structural—in the 
constitutional theory of process jurisprudence.4  The Trump case 
involved the Court’s construction of congressional legislation 
apparently limiting the President’s authority, but the present 
Essay does not address that aspect of the opinion.5 
Jackson was a great Justice, who also served as chief United 
States prosecutor at the Nuremburg Trials.6  Prior to joining the 
Court, he served as President Franklin Roosevelt’s Attorney 
General and advised the President on many complicated national-
security issues.7  He had a detailed, thoughtful, and practical 
† Paul Whitfield Horn Professor, Texas Tech University. 
1 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
2 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
3 See infra notes 143–160 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 149–157 & 168–172 and accompanying text. 
5 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408. The Court construed the statute in the President’s 
favor and in doing so presumably was influenced by a desire not to limit the 
President’s authority to protect the nation. Id. 
6 See NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 276 (2010). There is no good biography of Jackson. 
7 See WILLIAM R. CASTO, ADVISING THE PRESIDENT: ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT 
H. JACKSON AND FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 2 (2018).
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understanding of the intersection of law and national defense.  
Based upon Jackson’s extensive experience, he believed that the 
judiciary has a structural disability to assess national-security 
issues, and that judges will typically rubber-stamp a President’s 
purported national-security decision.8  In Korematsu v. United 
States,9 the Court—over Jackson’s dissent—approved the Presi-
dent’s egregious misconduct.  The Court has now done the same in 
Trump. 
A number of capable and thoughtful writers have vigorously 
criticized the Trump decision.10  The present Essay, however, does 
not condemn the Trump majority or its opinion.  Rather, it focuses 
in significant part on Jackson’s idea that courts are relatively 
incompetent to review the lawfulness of national-security deci-
sions, and that this blameless incompetence is a structural defect 
in government under the Constitution.  Jackson called it “the 
Achilles Heel of our constitutional system.”11  If Jackson’s view is 
accurate, the defect cannot be wholly corrected.  Nevertheless, we 
should strive to understand the nature of the problem, so that we 
can realistically assess judicial decision-making in national-
security cases. 
As a matter of neutrally applicable constitutional principles, 
the most disturbing aspect of the Trump Court’s decision is that 
the Justices split along “party” lines.  Five “Republican” Justices 
voted to support a Republican President’s decision, and four “Dem-
ocratic” Justices voted to overturn a Republican President’s dec-
ision.12  If the President had been a Democrat, perhaps some of the 
Justices might have changed their vote.13  In the author’s mind, 
 
8 Dennis J. Hutchinson, “The Achilles Heel” of the Constitution: Justice Jackson 
and the Japanese Exclusion Cases, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 455, 459, 468.  
9 323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of Japanese 
internment camps during World War II).  
10 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Trump v. Hawaii: “This President” and the National 
Security Constitution, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Shalini Bhargava Ray, Plenary Power 
and Animus in Immigration Law, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 13 (2019); Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court Simultaneously Overturned and Revived 
Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J.F. 641 (2019). 
11 Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 468.  
12 The five Justices in the Trump majority were appointed by Republican 
presidents. Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/ 
members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/UKJ4-QYEY] (last visited Mar. 4, 2021). 
Similarly, the four Trump dissenters were appointed by Democratic presidents. Id. 
13 In Trump, five Justices appointed by Republican presidents showed immense 
deference to a Republican President. See infra notes 148–155 and accompanying text; 
see also Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576–77, 2596–97 (2019) (four 
dissenting “Republican” Justices accept a Republican Administration’s position, 
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Jackson’s explanation of the Trump decision is more persuasive 
and certainly more attractive than the simplistic specter of raw 
partisan politics.   
The apparently partisan split also might be viewed as a matter 
of conservative Justices deciding a case based upon conservative 
principles and liberal Justices resorting to liberal principles.14  As 
a matter of process jurisprudence, there can be no valid objection 
to Justices resorting to their conservative or liberal principles in 
legislating through adjudicating the law of the land.  At the same 
time, Trump illustrates a problem at the outer limits of process 
jurisprudence. 
Trump is best understood as turning on the influential con-
cept of process jurisprudence, which for over a half century has 
exerted an extraordinary influence upon sophisticated American 
attorneys and judges.15  In judging seriously disputed matters, the 
concept’s adherents try to factor out the substantive desirability 
or propriety of the action under review.16  A central approach of 
process jurisprudence is to defer to the government actor best 
suited to decide the desirability or propriety of the action.17  This 
 
which was based on an obvious falsehood), discussed infra in notes 161–171 and 
accompanying text. More recently, the four “Republican” diehards did not even hint 
at deferring to a Democratic President’s use of prosecutorial discretion to defer the 
deportation of a class of individuals who were technically undocumented immigrants. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). 
14 In 2018, President Trump referred with disdain to an unwelcome judicial 
opinion from the Ninth Circuit as having been written by an “Obama judge.” See 
Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump’s Criticism of “Obama Judge,” Chief Justice Roberts 
Defends Judiciary as “Independent,” WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2018, 6:21 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rebuking-trumps-criticism-of-obama-judge-
chief-justice-roberts-defends-judiciary-as-independent/2018/11/21/6383c7b2-edb7-11e8-
96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html [https://perma.cc/QA2D-DUR8]. The President retort-
ed, “Sorry Chief Justice John Roberts, but you do indeed have ‘Obama judges,’ and 
they have a much different point of view than the people who are charged with the 
safety of our country.” Id. If the President had judicial philosophy in mind, his retort 
makes sense. One wonders, however, whether the retort was inspired by careful 
consideration of judicial philosophy. 
15 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Commentary, The Making of 
The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2031, 2040 (1994) (identifying process 
jurisprudence’s central texts as HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958) 
and HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953)). See also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1959). These books “provided the agenda, 
much of the analytic structure, and even the name of the ‘legal process school’ of the 
1950s and the 1960s.” Eskridge & Frickey, supra, at 2031. 
16 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 15, at 2038. 
17 Id. 
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approach confers great discretion on the selected actor to reach the 
best solution to a problem. 
Process jurisprudence originated in the 1940s and 1950s as an 
idea that would constrain conservative judges’ power to overturn 
liberal programs created by Congress, the President, and adminis-
trative agencies.18  In recent decades, conservatives have sought to 
enhance the power of Republican Presidents.  Process jurispru-
dence now supports this conservative agenda.19 
Process jurisprudence is primarily concerned with the judici-
ary and, as the name implies, addresses the process of judicial 
decision-making and not the substance of specific principles or 
rules created by judges.  In particular, judicial decisions should 
not be based upon some form of fact utilitarianism in which a judge 
in each case strives to reach an ad hoc result by weighing and 
balancing the interests of the specific parties and the facts of the 
specific case.  In Herbert Wechsler’s words, judicial decision-making 
in any particular case should rest on “reasons that in their 
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result 
that is involved.”20 
In addition, process jurisprudence teaches that when a judge 
is asked to review or enforce an act or action of another branch of 
government, the judge should carefully consider whether the other 
branch has a structural or political advantage in deciding the best 
course of action.  Ernest Young concisely encapsulated this idea: 
“[L]aw should allocate decision[-]making to the institutions best 
suited to decide particular questions, and . . . the decisions arrived 
at by those institutions must then be respected by other actors in 
the system, even if those actors would have reached a different 
conclusion.”21 
In Trump, the conservative majority resorted to process 
jurisprudence to legitimize the President’s project to discriminate 
against immigrants based upon their religion.22  At least, this 
 
18 Id. at 2032–33. 
19 For a recent analysis exploring the conservative/liberal flip-flop, see Jack M. 
Balkin, Why Liberals and Conservatives Flipped on Judicial Restraint: Judicial 
Review in the Cycles of Constitutional Time, 98 TEX. L. REV. 215, 216 (2019). 
20 Wechsler, supra note 15, at 19. 
21 Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 
DUKE L.J. 1143, 1149–50 (2005). Similarly, Professor Tushnet has suggested that 
judicial deference to the more political branches accommodates the rampant pluralism 
that dominates our society. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 13–14. One suspects, however, 
that Professor Tushnet is not a firm disciple of process jurisprudence. 
22 See infra notes 143–160 and accompanying text. 
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rationale is the strongest argument in favor of the Trump decision.  
The majority held that a President’s facially neutral policy whose 
underlying purpose was to discriminate against a minority 
religion was constitutional as long as the “policy is plausibly 
related to the Government’s stated objective to protect the 
country.”23  In other words, the Court will accept pretextual claims 
regardless of a program’s actual purpose. 
The Trump decision is easily explained in terms of Jackson’s 
belief that courts are relatively incompetent to review national-
security decisions.24  In addition and as a separate matter, Trump 
highlights a defect in process jurisprudence—the concept’s Achilles 
Heel, if you will.  Process jurisprudence is based upon an implicit 
assumption that government officers, more or less and with 
significant room for disagreement, act in good faith.  But what 
should we do when a President acts in bad faith?  This unfortunate 
possibility presents a threshold question of whether President 
Trump’s discrimination against a minority faith was or was not 
actually the purpose of his policy.  To put the matter differently, 
we must decide whether the President’s avowed purpose was 
pretextual and advanced in bad faith.   
The issue of the President’s actual bad faith is factual, and in 
the context of litigation, attorneys and law professors are quite 
uncomfortable about resolving disputed issues of fact.  That is for 
the factfinders.  Instead, we reflexively think in terms of what is 
arguable.  Moreover, anything is arguable.  After a long career, a 
highly respected law professor once concluded “[t]hat every 
proposition is arguable.”25   
As attorneys, we may think that everything is arguable.  But 
as human beings, we are quite willing to engage in factfinding 
regarding a person’s good faith.  All of us have encountered people 
who lie to us on important issues.  Most of us indulge a pre-
sumption of good faith, but we all understand that people some-
times lie.  As a result, we sometimes pass judgment on the bona 
fides of others.  This unpleasant task is simply an inevitable aspect 
of working with others.  We may not like it, but we must do it. 
The law has always recognized the sad fact of human mendac-
ity.  For example, in contract law, the issue of whether someone 
has acted in actual bad faith occasionally arises.  Reflecting the 
 
23 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (emphasis added). 
24 See infra notes 115–134 and accompanying text. 
25 DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 192 (2007) (quoting former 
Harvard Law professor Kingman Brewster). 
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painful existence of human duplicity, factfinders are not required 
to accept an individual’s self-serving claim of good faith.  Rather, 
a person’s good faith is routinely decided by reference to all the 
surrounding circumstances.26 
Part of the present Essay is based upon a factual deter-
mination that the President was consciously deceptive about the 
immigration order.27  His purpose was to harm people based on 
their religious faith, and his pretention of a national-security 
concern unrelated to religion appears to be pretextual.  There is 
overwhelming evidence to conclude that the President acted in 
subjective bad faith in enacting the travel ban.28  To repeat, this 
aspect of the present Essay is not concerned with whether an 
advocate could argue that the President acted in good faith—
anything is arguable.  The real problem is what to do when we 
conclude that a President is purposefully acting in bad faith—that 
he is consciously practicing to deceive.  What happens when the 
President purports that his action stems from a national-security 
purpose, but we seriously believe that it does not? 
This horrible problem is not unique to judicial review.  Some 
members of the Trump Administration have also had to reconsider 
their understanding of how Executive Branch officers generally 
should act.29  Take the case of leaking, which invites the develop-
ment of general guidelines regarding when it is appropriate to leak 
and when it is not.30  Under general guidelines, the widespread 
leaking of the Trump Administration is easily condemned.31  But 
others justify this unusual amount of leaking because the current 
President’s thoroughgoing mendacity is extraordinary, and 
“[e]xtraordinary times demand extraordinary actions.”32  Similarly, 
 
26 See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 440–42 (3d ed. 
2004); 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 38:21 (4th ed. 1990 & Supp. 2020). 
27 See David J. Bier, A Dozen Times Trump Equated His Travel Ban with a 
Muslim Ban, CATO AT LIBERTY (Aug. 14, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/ 
dozen-times-trump-equated-travel-ban-muslim-ban [https://perma.cc/8R73-K4EU]. 
28 See id. 
29 See, e.g., Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Leaks: When to Spill Secrets, 
FOREIGN AFFS., Mar.–Apr. 2018, at 48, 48; Peter Feaver, The Secret Sharers: Leaking 
and Whistle-Blowing in the Trump Era: Too Many Leaks, FOREIGN AFFS., Nov.–Dec. 
2018, at 199, 200 (2018) (discussing the propriety of leaking in light of unique concerns 
surrounding the Trump Administration). 
30 See, e.g., Walzer, supra note 29; Feaver, supra note 29, at 199. 
31 See, e.g., Feaver, supra note 29, at 199. 
32 Allison Stanger, The Secret Sharers: Leaking and Whistle-Blowing in the 
Trump Era: No Ordinary Times, FOREIGN AFFS., Nov.–Dec. 2018, at 202, 202 (2018) 
(arguing that the Trump Administration’s “assault on the rule of law and the norms 
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as a general proposition, members of the Executive Branch surely 
should strive to support their President’s policies.  Nevertheless, 
an anonymous “senior official in the Trump [A]dministration” has 
sincerely complained about the current President’s general 
ineptitude and total amorality.33  The official has assured the 
nation that “many of the senior officials in [Trump’s] own 
administration are working diligently from within to frustrate 
parts of his agenda and his worst inclinations.”34  There is ample 
evidence to support the empirical claim that many senior officials 
have actively sought to thwart the President’s agenda.35 
The Trump case presented the judiciary with the same prob-
lem that has bedeviled some members of the Trump Administra-
tion.  What should a person do when confronted with a President 
who is acting in bad faith?  What should the Court do about a 
President who claims to be acting to defend the nation, but who 
actually has an ulterior motive to harm members of a minority 
religious faith?  In regard to these questions, one of the most 
respected jurists of the last century quipped that judges are “not 
required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are 
free.”36 
In the President’s case, we know beyond dispute that he is an 
inveterate prevaricator.  Not just an occasional deceiver, but an 
inveterate deceiver.  The fact of his habitual, notorious, and wide-
spread practice of not telling the truth about anything and 
everything, large or small, is so well known that a judge easily 
could and should take judicial notice of this dismaying and 
engrained defect in his character.37  President Trump and his 
representatives have claimed that his action against Muslim 
immigrants stems from national-security necessity.38  There are 
 
and practices of American democracy” justifies leaking that may not otherwise be 
justified in other contexts).  
33 Anonymous, I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-
anonymous-resistance.html [https://perma.cc/39YY-4GQ7]. 
34 Id. See generally ANONYMOUS, A WARNING (2019). 
35 See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD, FEAR: TRUMP IN THE WHITE HOUSE, at xvii–xxii 
(2018) (reporting examples of senior White House officials, among other things, 
snatching documents from President Trump’s desk and talking him out of farfetched 
foreign policy actions). 
36 Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2251, 2575 (2019) (quoting United States 
v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 1977) (Friendly, J.)).  
37 This engrained defect in President Trump’s character is “generally known” and 
“can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b). 
38 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2436 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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ample grounds, however, to conclude that this claim is a sham.  
Before the election, he shouted to the rooftops that he planned to 
discriminate against Muslim immigrants based upon their religious 
faith and did just that after the election.39  But at his direction, his 
lawyers cleverly sought to disguise his discriminatory purpose by 
using predominately Muslim countries as a proxy for the Presi-
dent’s underlying discriminatory purpose.40 
Perhaps the President actually and sincerely believes that 
faithful Muslims are inherently dangerous to our national secu-
rity.  If so, the President’s discrimination against Muslims would 
be a good faith, albeit presumably unlawful,41 effort to protect us.  
If he had stated that he was taking action because he had national-
security concerns about the Islamic faith, his good faith could not 
have been seriously questioned.  His order, however, made no such 
statement.  Instead, he cleverly insisted that his concern was with 
immigrants who coincidentally come from specific predominantly 
Muslim countries.  This clever pretextual reason was not given in 
good faith.  Its evident bad-faith purpose was to pretend that the 
case did not present a direct conflict between discriminating 
against a minority religion and securing the nation against harm.42 
In real life, what do we do with someone who repeatedly prom-
ises that she will do something for a specific despicable reason and 
then does just that?  Obviously, all of us would assume that she 
acted for the reason that she had so avidly avowed.  But what do 
we do if this person now claims that she has fulfilled her promise 
for a non-despicable reason?  Add to this predicament the fact that 
the person is routinely untruthful.  To be sure, her pretentions of 
a non-despicable reason may as a matter of mathematical 
possibility be true.  But only a hopelessly naive person43 would 
accept her pretextual pretenses. 
The strongest justification for the Trump majority’s decision 
comes from process jurisprudence.44  But process jurisprudence 
implodes when government actors do not act in good faith.  To use 
 
39 Id. at 2435–36. The President’s shameful misconduct is briefly detailed in 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion. Id.  
40 Id. at 2417 (majority opinion) (citing President Trump’s request to his advisors 
to “legally” establish a Muslim ban).  
41 See id. at 2423 (renouncing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
(upholding the internment of Japanese-Americans as constitutional)). 
42 I thank my colleague Dustin Benham for this insight. 
43 Or perhaps someone utterly and helplessly enthralled to the proposition that 
anything is arguable. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 149–159 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Jackson’s words, what happens when an “irresponsible 
and unscrupulous” person45 is entrusted with the powers of the 
presidency? 
II.  THE PRESIDENT’S PREROGATIVE POWER 
Justice Jackson was a sophisticated, thoughtful, and prag-
matic judge who had immense hands-on executive experience at 
the highest levels of government.  His concurring opinion in the 
Steel Seizure Case46 has been regarded as “the greatest single 
opinion ever written by a Supreme Court justice.”47  In foreign 
policy and national defense cases, his opinion sets the stage for all 
discussions of the Constitution’s allocation of powers between the 
President and the Congress.   
Another aspect of Steel Seizure has been less explored.  
Jackson thought that the case implicated the President’s prerog-
ative power to violate the law in order to achieve a national good.48  
To put in bluntly, Jackson understood that the President has and 
should have a political, though not legal, power to act unlawfully.49  
In the Steel Seizure case, the President had unconstitutionally 
seized the nation’s steel industry during the Korean War.50  When 
the Justices discussed the case in conference, Justice Douglas 
noted Jackson’s comment that the “President can throw Consti-
tution overboard but we can’t.”51  At first glance, these words could 
be dismissed as a “simple colloquial condemnation” of the Presi-
dent’s action.52  But Jackson meant what he said: he believed that 
the President has a prerogative political power to disregard the 
Constitution when facing complicated issues.53  Moreover, Jackson 
believed that in some situations the President should do so. 
 
45 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
46 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
47 Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded To Include The Insular 
Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 242 n.2 
(2000). 
48 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
49 Id. at 653–54 (“[I]t is relevant to note the gap that exists between the 
President’s paper powers and his real powers.”).  
50 See id. at 699–700 (Vinson, J., dissenting); see also MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN 
AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (rev. ed. 1994) 
for the best general description of the case. See also CASTO, supra note 7, at 83–109. 
51 CASTO, supra note 7, at 101 (quoting Conference Notes, William O. Douglas, 
Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct. (May 16, 1952) (on file with the William O. Douglas Papers at 
the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.)). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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During Jackson’s tenure in the Executive Branch, he saw 
President Roosevelt throw the Constitution overboard more than 
once.  Based upon his direct personal experience, Jackson under-
stood that Roosevelt “had a tendency to think in terms of right and 
wrong, instead of terms of legal and illegal.  Because he thought 
that his motives were always good for the things that he wanted 
to do, he found difficulty in thinking that there could be legal 
limitations on them.”54 
President Roosevelt’s relative disdain for legal restrictions 
surfaced in his 1933 inaugural address, when the nation was in 
the depths of the Great Depression.  He warned the country that 
“it may be that an unprecedented demand and need for undelayed 
action may call for temporary departure from that normal balance 
of public procedure.”55  Roosevelt quickly followed through with his 
warning.  In an effort to lead the nation out of the Depression, he 
resolved to abandon the country’s gold standard for its currency.56  
He believed that the resulting inflation would help the plight of 
farmers and others by increasing the price of goods that they 
sold.57  To accomplish his program of controlled inflation, he was 
determined to devalue our currency.58  As a result, the farmers and 
others would receive more dollars for their goods and services, and 
they would have more dollars to pay their debts. 
There was, however, a major impediment to the controlled 
devaluation of the dollar.  Almost all corporate bonds, government 
bonds, mortgages, and other debt contracts called for payment in 
dollars but included gold clauses keying payment to the dollar 
value of gold rather than dollars.59  If the dollar were devalued, the 
amount due under the gold clauses would increase dramatically, 
which would impose great hardship on debtors.60  The federal gov-
ernment resolved this problem by voiding all these gold clauses.61  
Of course, creditors immediately challenged the government’s 
 
54 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 74 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003). Similarly, in an impromptu eulogy on 
Roosevelt’s death, Jackson remembered that the President “often was critical of our 
[legal] profession, of its backward-looking tendencies, its preoccupation at times with 
red tape to the injury of what he thought were more vital interests.” Id. at 168. 
55 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933). 
56 The story is well told in SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, AMERICAN DEFAULT: THE 
UNTOLD STORY OF FDR, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE OVER GOLD 78 (2018). 
57 Id. at xi. 
58 Id. at 49. 
59 Id. at 68–69. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 71. 
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action and the litigation quickly reached the Supreme Court in the 
Gold Clause Cases.62 
Jackson closely consulted with the President on the gold 
clause litigation.  He later remembered that during oral argument 
in the Court, “[s]ome very disturbing questions had been put to 
[Attorney General Homer Cummings] and these the President 
viewed as an indication that the devaluation policy might be held 
unconstitutional . . . .”63  The President was deeply disturbed, and 
in Jackson’s words, “[o]utright defiance of the Court was pos-
sible.”64 
A true constitutional crisis was in the offing: “The President 
was greatly concerned about the possible outcome of that case and 
was quite determined that he just could not accept an adverse 
decision.”65  Roosevelt considered various approaches, including 
outright public defiance of the Court.   
The President told others that he had actually drafted a “radio 
speech to be given on the night of the day the [C]ourt hands down 
the decision.”66  In the speech, Roosevelt described the dire conse-
quences that would flow from a Supreme Court decision enforcing 
the gold clauses.67  He also clearly stated that in this event he 
would not abide by the Court’s decision.  In his planned radio 
address, Roosevelt planned to say: 
[The Justices] have decided these cases in accordance with the 
letter of the law as they saw it.  It is nevertheless my duty to 
protect the people of the United States to the best of my ability.  
To carry through the decision of the Court to its logical and 
inescapable end will so endanger the people of this Nation that I 
am compelled to look beyond the letter of the law to the spirit of 
the original contracts.68 
Fortunately, the Court ruled five to four in the President’s favor69 
and thereby averted the crisis. 
 
62 Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 291 (1935); Nortz v. United 
States, 294 U.S. 317, 324 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 347 (1935). 
63 JACKSON, supra note 54, at 65. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 EDWARDS, supra note 56, at 167 (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt). 
67 See id. at 167–69. 
68 JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME 
COURT 99 (2010) (quoting the president’s draft). 
69 See EDWARDS, supra note 56, at 172. Given the sui generis political context, the 
Gold Clause Cases are almost never studied in Constitutional Law and almost never 
mentioned. 
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A few years later, the President wished to build a modern 
airport for the nation’s capital, but Congress was hopelessly 
“bogged down.”70  “The situation was ridiculous.”71  In Jackson’s 
words, the national airport “consisted of a pasture intersected by 
a highway.  When a plane came in, they had to close the road to 
traffic and open it again after the plane had landed.”72  “[T]he 
President was pretty much disgusted.”73  Congress had not appro-
priated funds specifically for an airport, but the Public Works 
Administration (“PWA”) and the Work’s Progress Administration 
(“WPA”) had enough money to commence construction.74  Roose-
velt told Jackson, “Bob, I want you to get [the WPA and the PWA 
together] at once and knock their heads together until you get that 
money knocked out of them.”75  Jackson did so, and groundbreak-
ing quickly commenced on the National, now Reagan, Airport.76   
Unfortunately, the President’s action was blatantly uncon-
stitutional,77 and Jackson knew so.  He later described the episode 
as “an instance in which . . . the President act[ed] beyond the 
Constitution.”78  Jackson had no qualms about this flagrant viola-
tion, which he viewed as a benign transgression, because the 
construction “invade[d] no private right and . . . took nobody’s 
property.”79  Moreover, he noted that but for “that Presidential 
initiative, Washington probably would have faced World War II 
without an adequate airport.”80  We see the technical issue in the 
 
70 See CASTO, supra note 7, at 22–24. 
71 Id. 
72 JACKSON, supra note 54, at 47. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 47–48. 
75 Id. at 48. 
76 Id. 
77 See Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The 
Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 20 (1998). A 
fundamental clause of the Constitution provides, “No Money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 9, cl. 7. Moreover, an old statute, still in effect today, outlawed the expenditure of 
funds without an authorizing appropriation. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018), amended by 
Further Additional Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-5 § 103, 133 
Stat. 11 (codifying a provision of the Anti-Deficiency Act, originally passed in 1870). 
In Jackson’s words, Roosevelt acted to expend funds “without congressional 
authorization or appropriation.” JACKSON, supra note 54, at 48. 
78 JACKSON, supra note 54, at 48. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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National Airport episode repeated in President Trump’s search for 
funds to construct his border wall.81 
The National Airport episode is hardly significant.  In fact, 
Jackson joked with the President about it.82  A far more serious 
problem arose two years later.  An act of Congress made govern-
ment wiretapping illegal, and Jackson so advised the President.83  
Nevertheless, Roosevelt directed Jackson to institute a program of 
illegal wiretapping.84  Jackson never changed his mind about the 
program’s illegality, but he complied with the President’s direc-
tive.85  Although the President violated a statute, his misconduct 
also had a significant constitutional dimension.  Under the consti-
tutional doctrine of legislative supremacy,86 a President is bound 
to follow an otherwise constitutional statute.  Jackson’s acquies-
cence in the President’s lawlessness was the basis for many 
decades of widespread intrusion into Americans’ privacy.87 
Roosevelt’s next unlawful action involved aiding Great Britain 
in its battle with Nazi Germany.88  At the time, the United States 
had not entered the war, and Britain stood alone against the Nazi 
Colossus.  We were neutral, but the President correctly viewed the 
beleaguered British as America’s first line of defense against the 
Nazis.  To assist the British, the President decided to sell them 
fifty old destroyers.89  The sale was technically illegal because it 
encroached upon the Congress’s plenary constitutional power to 
control the disposal of federal property,90 but the President carried 
 
81 See Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 2019); see also infra notes 
158–160 and accompanying text. 
82 JACKSON, supra note 54, at 48. In a jocular mood, the President “asked 
[Jackson] if he was likely to go to jail as a result . . . .” Id. Jackson quipped back, “I 
told him all that I could promise was to go to jail with him . . . .” Id. 
83 See CASTO, supra note 7, at 29, 45. At this time, the Constitution placed no 
limits on wiretapping. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–65 (1928). 
84 See CASTO, supra note 7, at 38. 
85 See id. 
86 English-speaking countries have followed this fundamental constitutional 
principle since Parliament beheaded Charles I in 1649. Louis J. Sirico Jr., The Trial 
of Charles I: A Sesquitricentennial Reflection, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 51, 52 (1999). 
87 See Heidi Kitrosser, It Came from Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and 
Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1413 (2010); CASTO, supra note 7, at 45–
46. 
88 See CASTO, supra note 7, at 66–70. 
89 Id. at 59–60, 66–67, 69. 
90 Id. at 62. 
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it out anyway.  Attorney General Jackson published an official 
opinion supporting Roosevelt’s unlawful action.91 
III.  THE RIDDLE OF EX PARTE MERRYMAN 
For the last fifteen years of his life, Jackson struggled to solve 
the riddle of the judiciary’s role when the President violates the 
Constitution in a national-defense context.92  He never found an 
answer.  Initially, he thought that the courts should strive to avoid 
judicial review of unconstitutional presidential misconduct.93  But, 
as a practical matter, this idea turned out to be unworkable. 
For Jackson, the Civil War case of Ex parte Merryman94 was 
the paradigm for national-security conflicts between the President 
and the judiciary.  He was thinking about Merryman as early as 
1940, when he wrote a book on the proper role of the Supreme 
Court in our society.95  At the beginning of the Civil War, when 
Congress was not in session, President Abraham Lincoln author-
ized his generals to take vigorous action against people they 
suspected of being disloyal to the Union.96  In Jackson’s words, the 
Lincoln administration “resorted to wholesale arrests without 
warrants, detention without trial, and imprisonment without 
judicial conviction.”97  At the same time, the President unilaterally 
suspended the writ of habeas corpus.98 
Following President Lincoln’s directive, the Union army 
arrested Maryland resident John Merryman, who later sought a 
writ of habeas corpus from Chief Justice Roger Taney of the 
Supreme Court.99  Taney ruled that the President lacked unilat-
eral constitutional authority to suspend the writ and ordered 
 
91 See Op. on Exch. of Over-Age Destroyers for Naval and Air Bases, 39 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 484 (1940). 
92 See infra notes 94–114 and accompanying text.  
93 Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFFALO L. 
REV. 103, 116 (1951). 
94 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
95 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 324–27 (1941). 
96 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147–48. 
97 Jackson, supra note 93, at 109. 
98 Id. 
99 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147. Taney was sitting on a lower court, as many 
sitting Supreme Court Justices did at the time. Id. 
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Merryman’s release.100  The army, however, refused to comply with 
the Chief Justice’s order.101   
When Jackson first considered the Lincoln/Taney riddle in 
1940, he was Attorney General, and he was sympathetic to Chief 
Justice Taney’s plight.102  But Jackson ventured no opinion on the 
merits of the conflict.103  He returned to the riddle a few years later 
when he was a Supreme Court Justice.  This time he was consider-
ing President Roosevelt’s egregious mistreatment of our Japanese-
American citizens on the West Coast.104 
In Hirabayashi v. United States, the Court considered a 
curfew applicable only to people of Japanese ancestry.105  The case 
was a precursor to the President’s infamous imprisonment of inno-
cent Japanese-American citizens.  Jackson believed that discrimi-
nation based solely upon a person’s ancestry was unconstitutional, 
but he was leery of reviewing a wartime military order.  In a 
lengthy footnote to an unpublished draft opinion, he returned to 
the Lincoln/Taney paradigm.106  He concluded: “I do not know that 
the ultimate cause of liberty has suffered, and it may have been 
saved by [Lincoln’s] questionable arrests.  I am sure the cause [of 
liberty] would have suffered if this Court had rationalized [the 
arrests] as Constitutional.”107  After much discussion, his fellow 
Justices convinced him to concur without opinion in a decision 
allowing the curfew to stand.108   
In 1951, Jackson returned to the Lincoln/Taney paradigm in 
a speech on “Wartime Security and Liberty under Law.”109  The 
problem continued to perplex him.  There was no clear solution 
because the problem turned upon “two rights, each in its own way 
important.”110  Our citizens have an expectation to be free from 
foreign attack, and they have an expectation that their civil 
 
100 Id. at 149. 
101 JACKSON, supra note 95, at 324 (“An aide-de-camp in full military uniform and 
appropriately wearing a sword, appeared and declined obedience to the ancient writ 
of freedom . . . .”). 
102 Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 467. 
103 Id.  
104 See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
105 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at, 88–89. 
106 Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 474 n.9. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 466–67. Jackson viewed the curfew as relatively minor and thought that 
the Court’s Hirabayashi decision would not foreclose a later de novo consideration of 
the imprisonment (internment) program. Id. 
109 Jackson, supra note 93, at 103. 
110 Id. at 117. 
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liberties will be preserved.111  The Lincoln/Taney paradigm pre-
sented this dilemma, and Jackson said, “if logic supports Taney, 
history vindicates Lincoln.”112 
Finally, at the very end of his life, he once more took up the 
Lincoln/Taney riddle and still could find no satisfactory answer.113  
He again concluded that history—but not law—vindicated 
Lincoln: “Had Mr. Lincoln scrupulously observed Taney’s policy, I 
do not know whether we would have had any liberty, and had the 
Chief Justice adopted Mr. Lincoln’s philosophy as the philosophy 
of the law, I again do not know whether we could have had any 
liberty.”114  In a sense, Jackson was content with the ultimate 
outcome.  Lincoln defended the nation, and Taney the law. 
IV.  THE JUDICIARY’S STRUCTURAL INCOMPETENCE 
Jackson believed that any judicial attempt to review national-
security or military decisions would always be inherently flawed.  
He believed that “[i]n the very nature of things military decisions 
are not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal.”115  In addition, 
serious evidentiary problems typically preclude judges from even 
considering much of the most pertinent evidence regarding these 
decisions, rendering them incompetent to weigh and balance 
relevant factors.   
In Korematsu v. United States, Jackson finally had to confront 
this structural defect when hearing a challenge to the govern-
ment’s internment of Japanese-American citizens.116  He noted the 
paucity of evidence on the fundamental issue of whether the 
internment order had “a reasonable basis in necessity.”117  There 
simply was “[n]o evidence whatever on that subject . . . taken by 
this or any other court.”118  All the Court had was a general’s 
“unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any cross-
examination.”119  Jackson’s concern about the paucity of evidence 




113 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT 76 (1955) (published posthumously). 
114 Id.  
115 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. at 215–16 (majority opinion). 
117 Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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of the United States confessed error in his predecessor’s conceal-
ment of information in Korematsu that drastically undercut the 
government’s case.120 
Jackson believed that lack of evidence would be the typical 
situation.  National-security and military orders frequently would 
be based on information not “admissible and on assumptions that 
could not be proved.”121  The information might be confidential and 
“could not be disclosed to courts without danger that it would 
reach the enemy.”122  Given these practical realities, “courts can 
never have any real alternative to accepting the mere declaration 
of the authority that issued the order that it was reasonably 
necessary from a military [or national-security] viewpoint.”123 
Even if the pertinent evidence were available, the judiciary 
would remain incompetent to gauge the reasonableness of a 
national-security decision.  In Jackson’s mind, the “very essence of 
the military job is to [gain] every strategic advantage.”124  He 
continued, “[n]o court can require such a commander in such 
circumstances to act as a reasonable man; he may be unreasonably 
cautious and exacting.”125  Thus in Korematsu, the commander 
may have been “unreasonably cautious and exacting” in sweeping 
up all of our Japanese-American citizens in order to isolate just a 
few potential spies.126  On issues of national security, you do not 
take chances.  Echoing his thoughts on the Lincoln/Taney riddle, 
Jackson conceded that as a matter of military, but not constitutional 
 
120 When Roosevelt’s Solicitor General argued Korematsu to the Court, he knew of 
and suppressed an Office of Naval Intelligence report, which said that “only a small per-
centage of Japanese Americans posed a potential security threat, and that the most dan-
gerous were already known or in custody.” Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor 
General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases, DEP’T OF JUST. 
(May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-
generals-mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases [https://perma.cc/AS3K-
XMJB]. In addition, “a key set of allegations used to justify the internment [was] that 
Japanese Americans were using radio transmitters to communicate with enemy 
submarines off the West Coast . . . .” Id. Roosevelt’s Solicitor General knew that these 
allegations “had been discredited by the FBI and FCC,” but the Solicitor General 
concealed the FBI and FCC conclusions. Id. 
121 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. In Korematsu, the information presumably would have been based upon 
the government’s actual knowledge of specific security threats posed by specific 
individuals. Jackson also noted that the courts could not “act on communications made 
in confidence.” Id. 
124 Id. at 244 (emphasis added). 
125 Id. 
126 Id.  
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analysis, “[p]erhaps [a commander] should be” “unreasonably cau-
tious and exacting.”127 
Jackson thought that the gravest threat to our constitutional 
order in national-security cases was the clear possibility that the 
Court would rubber-stamp national-security decisions—in other 
words, would rationalize them as lawful.128  This approach would 
turn the entire matter over to the political wisdom and judgment 
of the President.  In effect, this is precisely what happened in 
Korematsu and Trump: the Court in both cases approved the 
President’s egregious misconduct.  Because the Court in these 
cases likely would accept any President’s national-security 
rationale, Jackson concluded that as a practical matter, “[t]he 
chief restraint upon [executive abuse of power] must be [the 
Executive’s] responsibility to the political judgments of their 
contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.”129  He 
might have added that the President’s personal judgment would 
serve as an important third check. 
In Jackson’s mind, the ultimate nightmare would come to pass 
“[i]f the people ever let command of the war power fall into 
irresponsible and unscrupulous hands.”130  President Roosevelt’s 
lawlessness, however, did not seriously concern Jackson.  He abso-
lutely trusted Roosevelt’s personal judgement.  In the words of a 
careful and capable student of Jackson’s life, Roosevelt was 
Jackson’s “hero, friend, and leader.”131   
Jackson never solved the puzzle of the Lincoln/Taney paradigm.  
In Korematsu, he feared that the Court’s opinion would “lie[ ] 
about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority 
that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”132  
Moreover, he feared that the opinion would inevitably metastasize 
beyond its original limits.  Quoting Benjamin Cardozo, Jackson 
noted “[t]he tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of 
its logic.”133 
Jackson thought that the judiciary perhaps could avoid the 
puzzle’s irreconcilable conflict by simply abstaining from review-
ing national-security decisions.  But in his lifetime, abstention 
 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 245–46. 
129 Id. at 248. 
130 Id. 
131 John Q. Barrett, Introduction to JACKSON, supra note 54, at xiii.  
132 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
133 Id. (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
51 (1921)). 
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proved to be unworkable.  His idea only works if the other Justices 
cooperate.  They did not do so.134 
If we fully embrace Jackson’s analysis, we must understand 
that his thinking was not ad hominem.  He did not believe that his 
fellow Justices were recklessly conspiring to exult presidential 
power.  Felix Frankfurter, his best friend on the Court, voted to 
approve Korematsu’s imprisonment.  Rather, Jackson believed that 
his brethren were acting under a structural disability.  They 
simply could not bring themselves to overturn a President’s 
purported national-security decision. 
Finally, Jackson understood that the serious problem of 
judicial competence was not absolute.  In Korematsu, three 
Justices, including Jackson, voted to invalidate the government’s 
unconstitutional program of imprisonment, and in Trump, four 
Justices refused to abide by the President’s misconduct.135  
Jackson’s analysis of judicial incompetence is best viewed as a 
significant factor that will weigh heavily in judges’ decisions. 
Jackson never answered the Lincoln/Taney riddle to his 
satisfaction.  Instead he resorted to ad hoc solutions.  He voted to 
overturn a President’s national-security program in two high-
profile cases.136  His case-by-case approach suggests a pragmatic 
method for working around the judiciary’s national-security 
incompetence. 
In Korematsu, Jackson completely avoided the factual issue of 
whether the President’s imprisonment program was wise or even 
 
134 For detailed analyses of Jackson’s preferred approach to interfering with a 
President’s military or national-security decision, see Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 
458–59, and CASTO, supra note 7, at 101–09. Jackson believed that the judiciary 
should show great deference to the President and that the remedy of habeas corpus 
should not be used to interfere with a President’s national-security action. He 
conceded that under his preferred approach, Chief Justice Taney should not have 
challenged Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Jackson, supra note 93. 
He viewed the Korematsu case differently, because the courts could not abstain from 
a decision when the President had invoked the judicial process in a criminal 
prosecution. Id. at 115. 
Eugene Rostow excoriated Jackson’s Korematsu opinion as “a fascinating and 
fantastic essay in nihilism.” Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A 
Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 510 (1945). As a practical matter, however, Jackson’s 
abstention theory is quite unworkable. His theory does not work if the other Justices 
decide to address the merits. The abstaining Justice would simply be a Lone Ranger 
riding his “abstention hobby-horse.” CASTO, supra note 7, at 108–09. 
135 See generally Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214 (including dissenting opinions from 
Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) 
(referencing the four Justices in dissent: Breyer, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg). 
136 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 652–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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needed.137  Instead, he concluded as a matter of law that the Con-
stitution limited Roosevelt’s authority to protect our national 
security.  Regardless of need or necessity, Jackson decided that the 
Constitution does not permit the federal government to imprison 
people based solely on their parentage.138 
Jackson used the same approach in the Steel Seizure case.139  
During the Korean War, President Truman declared a national-
security emergency and seized the nation’s steel industry.140  There 
was a possible factual issue of whether there actually was an 
emergency.  In oral argument, however, Jackson plainly stated 
“[i]t is not our business to decide what is an emergency.”141  
Instead, he ruled as a matter of the law and without regard to 
national-security need or necessity that the President lacked 
authority to seize the steel mills.142  He believed that Congress had 
effectively removed the seizure power from the President’s hands. 
In Korematsu and Steel Seizure, Jackson never questioned the 
President’s judgment regarding the need for the national-security 
program.  Instead, he believed that as a matter of law, the Pres-
ident lacked authority to implement the two programs.  In 
Korematsu the Constitution preempted the President’s decision, 
and in Steel Seizure Congress did the same. 
V.  TRUMP 
The factual background to the Trump case is well known and 
need not be rehearsed in any detail.  During Trump’s presidential 
campaign, he promised to discriminate against Muslim immi-
grants based upon their religion if elected.143  After his election, he 
issued a series of executive orders that fulfilled his promise.144  As 
a technical matter, the President’s orders did not single out 
Muslims.  Rather, he singled out immigrants from several predom-
inantly Muslim countries.145   
 
137 See supra notes 116–134 and accompanying text. 
138 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 243–44 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
139 See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
140 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 582.  
141 48 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 923 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper 
eds., 1975). 
142 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 652–55 (Jackson, J. concurring). 
143 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435–46 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
144 Id. at 2436–39. 
145 The President’s order also excluded immigrants from North Korea and 
Venezuela. Trump, 138 S. Ct at 2399. These provisions should be dismissed as 
pretextual. Does anyone seriously believe that there is a problem of North Korean 
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Trump is a realization of Jackson’s predictions in Korematsu.  
The Justices—at least the majority—viewed themselves as incom-
petent to second-guess the President on a decision that the 
President claimed was based upon national-security concerns.  As 
Jackson predicted, the government refused to offer any evidence 
regarding the claimed underlying national-security threat.  For 
example, the majority noted that the proclamation establishing 
the discriminatory program explained that all reasons for issuing 
the order could not be made public: “Describing all of those reasons 
publicly, however, would cause serious damage to the national 
security of the United States . . . .”146 
Jackson viewed the concern about national security as a factor 
that might unconsciously influence a judge’s decision.  Surely, 
national-security concerns exert an invisible gravitational pull in 
the judicial process.  In Korematsu, Jackson refused to “distort the 
Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient,” 
and worried that “the Court appear[ed] to be doing [so], whether 
consciously or not.”147  In Trump, the majority consciously bowed 
before the President’s national-security claims.  The majority 
frankly stated, “ ‘[W]hen it comes to collecting evidence and draw-
ing inferences’ on questions of national security, ‘the lack of 
competence on the part of the courts is marked.’ ”148 
The five Justices in the majority were aware of the elephant 
in the room, and presumably understood that the President’s 
purpose in enacting the travel ban was to cleverly discriminate 
against a minority religious faith.  They knew that one of his 
senior advisors had explained that the President asked him in 
private to “[p]ut a commission together” to “legally” assemble a 
Muslim ban.149  The majority tried to dance around that elephant 
by accusing the dissenters of using a reasonable-person standard, 
one that would empower the judiciary to overturn a national-
 
terrorists entering our country through the ordinary immigration system? In any 
event, there already is an order excluding North Korean nationals. See Exec. Order 
No. 13,810, 82 Fed. Reg. 44,705, 44,707–08 (Sept. 20, 2017); Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2442 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The President’s inclusion of Venezuelan immigrants is 
also pretextual. Only a few Venezuelan officials and their immediate families are 
barred from entry. See id. 
146 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,165 (Sept. 24, 2017), quoted in 
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2409 n.2.  
147 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244–45 (1944). 
148 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 
U.S. 1, 34 (2010)). 
149 Id. at 2417 (quoting a Trump advisor recalling his discussions with the 
President). 
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security decision based upon judges’ independent evaluations of 
reasonableness.150  This supposed reasonable-person standard, 
however, is a strawman because the President was guilty under 
any known standard of judicial factfinding.  The most stringent 
standard for making factual determinations is “beyond a reason-
able doubt,” where the factfinder must be in a “ ‘subjective state of 
near certitude’ of [a criminal] defendant’s guilt.”151  Even under 
this most stringent standard, the evidence in Trump easily 
established presidential guilt.152 
The President’s misconduct in this case is the ultimate night-
mare for process jurisprudence.  In terms of decision-making on 
national-security issues, the courts have demonstrated a lack of 
competence.153  Moreover, process jurisprudence demands that 
judges eschew ad hoc decision-making and premise decisions on 
neutral principles that “transcend any immediate result that is 
involved” and would also apply to future cases.154  A basis for 
overturning the President’s decision must be equally applicable to 
the judicial review of future Presidents’ national-security actions. 
Being capable human beings, the majority fully understood 
that the President’s facially neutral proclamation was pretextual.  
The President’s obvious purpose was to discriminate against a 
minority religion.  In a single sentence buried in the middle of its 
opinion, the majority candidly explained “we must consider not 
 
150 Id. at 2420 n.5. 
151 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 7 (8th ed. 2018) (quoting 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979)). 
152 Suppose, for example, that a private person had a lengthy history—comparable 
to President Trump’s—of expressing personal animus towards Muslims in general, 
and like the President, she had vowed to harm Muslims. Suppose also that, unlike 
President Trump, the private person had gone to a part of town that she knew to be 
predominantly Muslim, entered a Muslim store, and randomly committed crimes 
against the people that she encountered. She is then indicted on a number of counts, 
including hate crimes. The applicable hate-crime statute applies only when the 
accused’s actions are motivated by an animus to harm persons based upon their 
religion. At the trial, the defendant insists that her purpose was not to harm Muslims 
specifically—that she was simply trying to harm persons on a random basis. Let us 
also assume that the prosecution impeaches the defendant’s testimony with an 
avalanche of proof that the defendant, like President Trump, is an inveterate liar. 
If you, the reader of the present Essay, were on the jury, would you—in your heart 
of hearts—decide that, contrary to the defendant’s pretentions, her purpose was to 
harm Muslims? 
153 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (“ ‘[W]hen it comes to collecting evidence and 
drawing inferences’ on questions of national security, ‘the lack of competence on the 
part of the courts is marked.’ ” (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 
1, 34 (2010))).  
154 Wechsler, supra note 15, at 19.  
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only the statements of a particular President, but also the au-
thority of the Presidency itself.”155  The majority appeared to be 
worried about creating a rule that would hamper a future 
President’s good-faith efforts to protect our national security.  It 
apparently wished to create a standard that would generally bar 
judicial review of future presidential actions.  A standard that re-
quires factfinding would require a trial.  In contrast, the majority’s 
standard merely requires a judge to conjure a hypothetically 
legitimate purpose regardless of the President’s actual purpose.  
This standard will facilitate pretrial motions to dismiss or grants 
of summary judgment. 
Some commentators have rejected the Trump majority’s 
extreme deference and have argued for more skepticism, more 
searching scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, and other similar ap-
proaches.156  These sensible proposals, however, do not address the 
Trump majority’s overriding concern to guard future Presidents’ 
national-security decisions.  All of these approaches would involve 
more extensive judicial review of national-security measures.  
Those who are so inclined might tease possible limitations out 
of the Trump Court’s decision.  The Court stated and restated that 
their review is limited to “whether the Executive gave a ‘facially 
legitimate and bona fide’ reason for its action.”157  Perhaps a 
facially legitimate presidential decision taken in bad faith would 
be subject to a more stringent review.  The apparent requirement 
of good faith, however, must be dismissed as mere window 
dressing.  Whether someone has acted in good faith is a factual 
issue to be determined by the entire context of the action under 
review.  The Trump case involved the strongest possible evidence 
of presidential bad faith.  If this evidence of bad faith does not 
suffice, there can be no realistic situation in which the Trump 
majority would hold a President not to have acted in good faith.158 
Jackson’s opinions in Korematsu and the Steel Seizure case 
suggest a way of working around the Justices’ understandable re-
luctance to second-guess a President’s national-security decision.  
 
155 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418. 
156 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 10, at 9, 12; Ray, supra note 10, at 61; Eric K. 
Yamamoto & Rachel Oyama, Masquerading Behind a Facade of National Security, 
128 YALE L.J.F. 688, 691 (2019). 
157 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 
(1972)). 
158 See Ray, supra note 10, at 62–63. 
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In each case, Jackson concluded as a matter of law that pres-
idential authority to protect our national security had been 
removed from the presidency’s hands.  Perhaps the best way to 
deal with difficult factual issues like motivation, need, and 
necessity is to consider whether a President has the legal au-
thority to take a particular action.  For example, when the 
President’s need for funds to construct a border wall comes to the 
Supreme Court, the better part of valor will be to avoid factual 
issues.  A better legal argument would be that, in respect to the 
availability of funds, Congress has carefully and fully considered 
the need for a wall.159  The upshot is that Congress—not the 
President and certainly not the judiciary—has decided that a wall 
is unnecessary and that therefore Congress refused to make the 
necessary appropriations.  This analysis is fully supported by the 
well-established constitutional doctrine that Congress has plenary 
power over expenditures of federal funds.160 
VI.  THE CENSUS CASE 
The problem of blatant misrepresentation arose again in 
Department of Commerce v. New York, which involved the admin-
istration’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 
census.161  The state of New York challenged this question on 
grounds that it would undercount noncitizen and Hispanic house-
holds, a move that arguably would give Republicans a structural 
electoral advantage.162  The administration defended the question 
as needed to enforce the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), but the 
evidence established that this bizarre claim was pretextual.163  
Therefore the Court was left with a raw decision unsupported by 
any reason whatsoever.  
 
159 See Emily Cochrane & Catie Edmondson, Border Security, Foreign Aid and a 
Raise for Federal Workers: What You Need To Know About the Spending Package, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/us/politics/congress-trump-
border-deal-wall.html [https://perma.cc/5QF6-UA3V]. 
160 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
161 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2019). 
162 Brief for Government Respondents at 1, Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 
2551 (No. 18-966), 2019 WL 1468270, at *1; see also Letter Brief for Plaintiff N.Y. 
Immigr. Coal. at 1, Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. 2551 (No. 18-966) (letter to district court 
judge requesting an order to show cause in light of new evidence showing that a 
Republican operative proposed the citizenship question as a means of disadvantaging 
Democratic electoral prospects). 
163 Brief for Government Respondents at 54, Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. 2551 (No. 
18-966), 2019 WL 1468270, at *54. 
2020] JACKSON’S CRITIQUE OF TRUMP V. HAWAII 359 
In the Census Case, Chief Justice Roberts gagged on the 
administration’s falsehoods.  He began by noting that “the VRA 
enforcement rationale—the sole stated reason [for the question]—
seems to have been contrived.”164  He then noted that the admin-
istration’s justifications were “incongruent with what the record 
reveal[ed]”; highlighted “the disconnect between the decision made 
and the explanation given”; declared the Department’s explanation 
“a distraction”; and concluded that “[a]ccepting contrived reasons 
would defeat the purpose of the [administrative] enterprise.”165 
The Chief Justice noted that “[o]ur review [of agency action] 
is deferential, but we are ‘not required to exhibit a naivete from 
which ordinary citizens are free.’ ”166  Notwithstanding the Chief 
Justice’s allusion to naiveté, four Justices—three from the erst-
while Trump majority—did not gag on the administration’s deceit.  
In the words of a famous Victorian, the dissenters essentially said, 
“[p]lease, sir, [we] want some more.”167   
The four dissenters in the Census Case obviously are not naïve 
jurists.  They thought that the Chief Justice’s conclusion was “ex-
traordinary,”168 which it was.  But they studiously avoided con-
sidering whether the administration in fact misrepresented the 
reason for its action. 
The dissenters could not find their way out of a dark cul-de-
sac at the outer limits of process jurisprudence.  Several protested 
that the majority opinion “opened a Pandora’s box of pretext-based 
challenges in administrative law.”169  In the alternative, several 
wrote “[h]opefully [the majority decision] comes to be understood 
as an aberration—a ticket good for this day and this train only.”170  
Presumably, the dissenters hope that the majority opinion 
will be ignored as a sport or aberration with no precedential value.  
If so, the decision is a function of ad hoc, unprincipled analysis.  
This violates one of the central tenets of process jurisprudence.  In 
 
164 Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2575. 
165 Id. at 2575–76. 
166 Id. at 2575 (quoting United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 
1977)). 
167 CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 12 (Ella Westland ed., Woodsworth Editions 
Ltd. 1992) (1838).  
168 Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2578 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
169 Id. at 2583; accord id. at 2605 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[W]idespread judicial 
review of the Secretary’s conduct of the census will usher in an era of ‘disruptive 
practical consequences.’ ”). 
170 Id. at 2584 (Thomas, J., dissenting); accord id. at 2597 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]oday’s decision is either an aberration or a license for widespread judicial inquiry 
into the motivations of Executive Branch officials.”). 
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Herbert Wechsler’s words, judicial decisions should rest on 
“reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend 
any immediate result that is involved.”171   
For the dissenters, the worst-case scenario is that the 
majority’s decision is based upon general and neutral principles 
that transcend the immediate result.  This scenario would save the 
decision from unprincipled decision-making but would run square-
ly into another key tenet of process jurisprudence.  There can be 
no doubt that administrative matters like framing the census are 
best done by the Executive Branch—not the judiciary.  The dis-
senters were likely worried that the majority opinion would usher 
in a new era in which the judiciary would constantly be second-
guessing the Executive’s administrative decisions. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Our “irresponsible and unscrupulous” President was a night-
mare for those—like the present author—who still believe in 
process jurisprudence.172  Hopefully Trump’s precedential value 
will be limited to national-security cases.  When Chief Justice 
Roberts called foul in the Census Case, he was not reviewing a 
national-security decision.  
Trump is technically distinguishable from most national-
security cases that are likely to arise in the future.  Perhaps 
Trump applies only to immigration cases that do not involve the 
individual rights of one of our citizens or of an alien lawfully 
present in the United States.  On the other hand, if Justice 
Jackson is right, the majority’s action should be read as a simple 
rubber-stamping of a President’s pretended national-security 
decision.  Under this reading of the Court’s opinion, the next 
controversial national-security case will again result in a majority 
of the Justices blindly accepting a President’s decision and 
perhaps identifying some new set of convenient limiting or 
distinguishing factors. 
The Court’s structural incompetence to review national-
security actions will significantly enhance the judicial inclination 
to expand principles to the limits of their logic.173  We may safely 
predict that Trump will become an integral part of the govern-
ment’s future defense of all national-security actions.  The opinion 
 
171 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
172 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944).  
173 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018). 
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will lie around “like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any 
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of . . . urgent 
need.”174  Indeed, the government’s brief in Trump argued that the 
President’s overriding national-security power should extend to 
domestic action that seems to violate the Constitution.175 
The practical limits of the Trump decision are a function of 
the Court’s willingness to bow before a national-security Presi-
dent.  The ultimate problem for the Trump majority is how far they 
should push their entirely legitimate, process-jurisprudence 
concerns about future Presidents’ constitutional authority.  To 
repeat, the Trump presidency was a nightmare for those of us who 
still cleave to process jurisprudence. 
 
 
174 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
175 Brief for the Petitioners at 64–65, Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), 2018 
WL 1050350, at *64–65. 
